Do not worry, you are not a fool, no. First of all, you do not have ivory. Still nose. A cute little tail
The main problem that I noticed in this presentation is that in an important part it is usually a claim to assert. For example, at 2:23, we insist that consciousness is a biological phenomenon. Yes, is that so? Is this a problem? How do you prove it by way of argument? Furthermore, shortly thereafter, "The explanation that it appears in certain kindreds of primitive mankind is obviously a question that evolutionary biologists should consider." Oh? why? What about admitting the opposite argument? Or at 4: 32: "We have discussed that consciousness as a biological process that is explained by neurobiology and other kinds of mechanisms, which explicitly can be explained based on evolution."
Then at 2:35 we get: "If phenomenological perception can be cognitive science, neurobiology, etc. If you ask how the heart works, then you are in anatomy and molecular biology There will be no different reason. "Well, most of us see justifiable reasons that things should be different. Why do not you admit them?
He concluded that consciousness in principle does not cause "scientific naturalism". Of course, if you ignore and hide a compelling argument bunch, many of them are already already shared with this sub forum, especially with themes created by Titus Rivas. Strangely, he did not even mention the existence of these arguments.
By the way, I think his explanation of the lack of importance of the difficult problem between 2: 52 and 3: 17 is based on his hypothesis claims - cutting those assumptions (through persuasive discussions) Then, it has almost the same meaning as other methods.
At the undergraduate level, I am a philosophical student, and this famous article by Dr. Thomas Nagel plagues me. So what kind of feel is the bat, Nagel believes that you can know what it is as long as you know something. We do not have bat experience, so we certainly do not know how it feels like being a bat. We are the only ones who can understand our experience.
An American philosopher Thomas Nagel's paper, first published in "Philosophical Review" in October 1974, later published in Nagel's "Personal Problems", said, "How does it feel to be a bat" is. (1979). Among them, Nagel believes materialism in materialism ignores the basic elements of consciousness, that is, the existence (or emotion) of certain, conscious things. Daniel Dennet criticized Nagel's claim and called it "consciousness". The impact of the broadest quotation and thought experiment. ": 441
Thomas Nagel wants to know "What kind of person is the bat?" (1974); or at least this is the problem he raised in advancing spiritual philosophy research. Nagel was born in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, received a bachelor's degree in the philosophy of Cornell University and was introduced to the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Before acquiring my Ph.D., I continued my studies at the famous language philosopher J.L. Austin of Oxford University. Harvard University in 1963. In this article, he refuted the materialistic reductionism awareness that dominated the field of spiritual philosophy of the time, and promoted the subjectiveism method. Even if we could explain objectively the physical process that we consciously understand for simplicity, since consciousness is a subjective psychological experience, this means that we can make consciousness itself I believe it will not be possible to explain.