The pitfalls of learning from historical experience: the British Army’s debate on useful lessons for the war in Afghanistan

Why does the army often convey the lessons of their past and can not consistently apply? Using the concept of "hierarchical organizational culture", this paper explains innovative theoretical arguments to explain how military organizations learn from historical experience. This paper analyzes the empirical data from the British 's internal debate, observing the inherent incompatibility between the experience gained from the British - Afghanistan war on the one hand and the UK anti - riot movements on the other. This is not the result. Actual difference in the external environment, but changing the "filter" of the organization: If the military organizational culture level is different, the method of choosing and providing related courses from war experiences will differ. The old and new culture layers can interact and contribute to the current incoherent strategy development. This discussion is explained by a review of the stratification process within the British Army since the 19th century. This article shows the transition from emphasizing the specialty of local contexts to applying universal principles. This has a contemporary meaning. During the first few months of deployment in the UK in Afghanistan in 2006, compatible but incompatible historical lessons brought about a big contradiction in business strategy.

Until recently, however, the Army has focused on large-scale normal operations and 'big wars', especially civil war, World War II, and not so much historical 'lessons learned'. During such two world wars from 1919 to 1941 and during the period before the Gulf War such a transformation like a "fundamental reform" after 1898, it is this war I am ready to fight. Institutionally, the Army almost ignores studies of irregular conflicts that continue to be a more general experience of service.

Why does the army often convey the lessons of their past and can not consistently apply? Using the concept of "hierarchical organizational culture", this paper explains innovative theoretical arguments to explain how military organizations learn from historical experience. This paper analyzes the empirical data from the British 's internal debate, observing the inherent incompatibility between the experience gained from the British - Afghanistan war on the one hand and the UK anti - riot movements on the other. This is not the result. Actual difference in the external environment, but changing the "filter" of the organization: If the military organizational culture level is different, the method of choosing and providing related courses from war experiences will differ. The old and new cultural layers interact to contribute to the current incoherent strategic development

Traps learned from historical experience: Discussion on British military useful lessons on war in Afghanistan

• The evidence for studying the course at the operational level is not that strong. The commitment to determine advanced courses is clear. British forces seemed to have achieved and achieved considerable success in that experience. However, the mechanism for doing this at the business level is not clear as it is not clear. Presenter Dr. Martijn Kitzen, Alexander Bon, LtCol D. Bosch, Dutch Defense Academy Thesis "Educational Rebellion: The Netherlands Experience" Abstract In this article we will focus on the rebellious education at two different times by Dutch officials. Efforts of military education in the Netherlands to improve COIN skills