The Dogmatism Paradox and the Problem of Misleading Evidence

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As a by-product of solving the coincidence test paradox Solkripk proposed a "doctrinal paradox" that seems to indicate that knowledge requires doctrinal theory. In this paper, the author analyzes the nature of the doctrinal paradox from the viewpoint of logic mechanics. The authors believe that doctrinal paradoxes are better understood as knowledge attribution rather than knowledge paradoxes. Therefore, you can solve the doctrinal paradox without sacrificing the trapped principle of enlightenment. Based on the relevant alternative theory of the famous version, the author analyzed the logic of knowledge attribution, that is, how to reform the knowledge attribution by formalizing public undo logic and expanding related substitutions.

It is an abstraction. My goal is to solve the doctrinal paradox of Kripke, which is that it is not unreasonable for A to ignore all the evidence for p against A for known specific proposition p. In the process I propose that the definition of A is about the doctrine of p, and in statement A, distinguish between objective and subjective "should", all evidence for p should be ignored. In most cases, I will deal with the original version of Kripke's paradox. In this case, the subject would like to avoid losing her true faith or getting a wrong belief; in the last section, I studied the possibilities of the paradox. This paradox is for the subject with knowledge above anything else.

Well, this is my solution to the doctrinal paradox that Kripke originally proposed, or even dissolved it. Before going to the last section of another version of the paradox let me talk about the knowledge in public opinion and the role I play in its analysis. On the previous page, I think the argument of Kripke (i) - (vi) is not wrong. I can not forget that my solution to the objective version of public opinion actually produces a stronger form of the (i) - (vi) argument: if p is true and A thinks p, A It should be subjective, I decided not to be affected by any evidence for p. Therefore, if what we have mentioned so far is correct, we can rationally conclude that A should be a doctrine about p, even though the premise (iii) is weakened to "p" . Yes, A believes in p '. Further, the premise (i) is an idle state. I think that this result is very popular.