The Dogmatism Paradox and the problem of misleading evidence

It is an abstraction. My goal is to solve the doctrinal paradox of Kripke. It is not unreasonable for A to ignore all the evidence for p for a particular proposition p known to p. In the process I propose that the definition of A is about the doctrine of p, and in statement A, distinguish between objective and subjective "should", all evidence for p should be ignored. In most cases, I will deal with the original version of Kripke's paradox. In this case, the subject would like to avoid losing her true faith or getting a false belief; in the last section I examined the possibility of a paradox. This paradox is for the subject with knowledge above anything else.

Well, this is my solution to the doctrinal paradox that Kripke originally proposed, or even dissolved it. Before proceeding to the last section of the other version of the paradox, let me first talk about the knowledge in public opinion and the role I play in its analysis. On the previous page, I think the argument of Kripke (i) - (vi) is not wrong. I can not forget that my solution to the objective version of public opinion actually produces a stronger form of the (i) - (vi) argument: if p is true and A thinks p, A It should be subjective, I decided not to be affected by any evidence for p. Therefore, if what we have mentioned so far is correct, we can rationally conclude that A should be a doctrine about p, even though the premise (iii) is weakened to "p" . Yes, A believes in p '. Further, the premise (i) is an idle state. I think that this result is very popular.