Dualism assertion Dualism is the theory that mind and matter are two different things. The main argument of dualism is that the facts about the objective external world of particles and force fields revealed by the modern physics science are not about the fact that things appear from a specific point of view but the facts of subjective experience is that things are It is about how it is from individual consciousness. From the subject point of view. They must be described in first person and third person.
A series of dualism arguments consists of standard opposition to physicalism. The main example is based on the existence of qualia, the most important of which is the so-called "knowledge theory". Since this parameter has its own entry (see entry qualia: knowledge parameter), it is handled relatively easily here. But all discussions on physi- calism are arguments that are irreducible and meaningless minds, and remember that considering the existence of the material world, it is a dualistic debate.
Philosophers and scientists such as Victor Reppert, William Hasker, Alvin Plantinga proposed a dualism argument called "rational argument". They believe in CS Lewis in the book of his "miracle" to discuss first; Lewis called it the "difficulty of cardinal cardinalism", this is the title of the third chapter of the miracle is. Discussion assumes that there is no reason to believe that they are the result of a reasonable basis if all our thoughts are affected by physical reasons, as naturalism requires. However, reasoning reasoning can understand knowledge. So, if naturalism is the truth, there is no way to know it other than luck.
So far, all arguments in this section are simply arguments of attribute dualism, or neutrality between attributes and material dualism. In this section and section 4.5, we consider several arguments that promote material dualism. The discussion in this section can be used as a preparation for 4.5, which concentrates on dissatisfaction of dualism of nature in the form of Humean. Berkeley found a theory that resembled the theory in the text of Hume's "Hum" in his "Philosophical Review" (Note A, pages 577-81), but later rejected it. concept. John Foster expresses Berkeley's view in a more contemporary language