Smart’s Belief That Brain-processes are Identical to Mental Sensations

Explain how Smart thinks the process of the brain is the same as psychological emotion. From the standpoint of identity theorists, smart people think that psychological emotions are the same as corresponding brain processes. Most of Smart's papers are against the dual list, which is the biggest competitor of identity theorists. In biology, chemistry, and physics, science has explained the majority of the human body; the brain is still mysterious.

In his paper "Emotion and Process of the Brain" (1959), J. J. C. Smart quotes Occam's razor to prove that his choice for thinking-brain identity theory is beyond spirit-body dualism. Dualists pointed out that there are two kinds of substances in the universe: substances (including the body) and spirit, non-material. In contrast, identity theorists believe that everything, including consciousness, is important, and nothing is not important. While it is impossible to appreciate its spirit when it is confined to the problem, Smart insists that identity theory explains all phenomena by assuming only physical reality. After that, Smart took serious criticism as using (or exploiting) Occam's razor and ultimately withdrew its support in this context. Paul Churchland (1984) pointed out that Occam's razor itself is not yet definitive from a duality point of view.

Smart (smart) will say that only half of the relationship between emotion (emotion) and the brain process is coincidental. A complete description (including its cause and effect) of the state and process of the brain means the report of inner experience, but since the latter is a neutral subject, very abstract is a neurological description It does not mean. Chalmers (1996) developed a nonphysical theory in a thorough study of his consciousness, which to some extent avoided concerns of legal scholars. The concern expressed by Smart (1959) is that, in the presence of non-physical properties, the most incredible is that neurophysiological processes must be clearly associated with simple attributes. Cantilever science network (called by Feigl)

Some philosophers believe that experience is a process of the brain but they are basically non-physical, mental and attribute, and sometimes called "qualia". Here we regard the identity theory as denying the existence of such irreducible nonphysical properties. Although there are identity theorists who perform behavior analysis of mental states such as beliefs and desires, others who are sometimes called "central state materialists" say that the state of mind is the state of the actual brain . Identity theorists often describe themselves as "materialists", but "physicists" may be better words. In other words, a person may be a materialist about the mind, but I think that the entity mentioned in physics still is not being described fun as "substance"