Restoring Mind-Brain Supervenience: A Proposal

Supernatural mind and brain recovery: Summary of the proposal: In this article, psychological causation - at least for the purpose of sexual act - is possible only when "heart / brain super convenience" is obtained I examined the statement that. Despite all the bad news received in recent years, the super convenience of the mind / brain can be the best way to solve "rejection problems" physicists troubled many psychological causal relationships It has been suggested. In Section 3, we introduced mainly hyper-local "nonlocal" heart / brain supernatural phenomena depending on the state of a specific type of brain, ie participation behavior generation.

This is neither true nor true. Consciousness does not exist in your brain nor is it created by your brain. This is a very special form of super-intelligence and is inconsistent for various reasons. One thing is that Jeffrey Schwartz shows that your mind can change your brain. But Searle is doing the right thing. It does not matter what consciousness is repeated for specific things in order to make them aware. But the questioner was not intimidated. Searle's answer really did not solve the problem. The questioner correctly pointed out what almost everyone in the Western European countries thinks natural. Everything we have is the product of a purely physical process. Our attempt to create a new and better AI is an extension of this physical process. If this physical process creates consciousness, of course it could be done again, especially when consciously trying.

Davidson used a supernatural argument: the mental state exceeds the physical state, but can not be reduced to a material state. Therefore, 'super convenience' represents functional dependency. Without an ontological reduction possibility, there is some change in the physical causal reducibility between mind and physics, and the mind does not change. Critics often regard this as a paradox as nonreducible physiological theory attempts not only to maintain an ontological distinction between the mind and the body, but also attempts to solve "interpretation problems" in some way , It points out that it resembles classicism. The brain is regarded not as a mind but as a fundamental "cause", and the mind seems to be inactive