Personal Identity by Derek Parfit

In his 1971 paper "Personal Identity", Derek Parfit believes it is possible and desirable to release it from the premise of personal identity without losing all its importance. In researching how to do this, Parfit concluded that "the problem of identity is not important" (Parfit, 1971, p. 2: 3). In this article I will prove that the paper by Parfit is effective and positive for human behavior. In the first half of this article we will review the paper in further detail and in the second half we face criticism and evaluate Parfit's assertions.

Derek Parfit explained and explained the difference between non-minimalist and minimalist's personal identity in Parfit in 1984 (he initially put it in "simple" view and "complex" view of Parfit 1973 I divided). For the first statement of the psychological criteria of identity, see "Consistency Persistence" in 1979 by John Locke of Locke and Nedditch. For non-inductive objections, see Thomas Reid's Prose for Man and Butler's Knowledge 1736. Advocacy for Contemporary Psychology, Harold-Noonan's Identity, and 1984 Sydney Schubert's Shoe Maker's Contribution For non-reductionism of modern identity, see Swinburne's contribution. For the modern support of biological standards, see Olson 1997.

Derek Parfit was one of the first contemporary theorists who explicitly explored the relationship between identity and morality from the "personal identity" that began in the early 1970s, in particular "the principle of self-and late morals". That is his remark and prospect of development. The third part of his book, Reasons and People (published in 1984), then the paper was obtained. In many respects, Parfit is a description of Rockman's personal identity despite major deviations. He is a "reductionist" and the facts about human and individual identity include more specific facts about the brain, the body, a series of interrelated psychological and physical events (Parfit 1984, 210-211). Negative reductionism is called "non-return principle". According to this doctrine, facts about human and individual identity usually include facts about Descartes' self or spirit.

Derek Parfit proposes the theory of the human ontological state that is expected to answer the fission problem and the paradox of individual identity. This article does not fairly deal with the complexity of Paffett's theory which has been the focus of discussion since 1970, but it is worth mentioning its main features. Although Parfit confirms the existence of human beings, their special ontological status as non-independent substances can be expressed by arguing that people do not need to be listed separately in the list of existing items . In particular, people themselves are different from their own bodies and minds, but the existence of people has only brain and body, and a series of interrelated psychological and physical events. These are basic arguments of Parfit's simplification theory. Let's think about analogy: Celini's Venus is made of bronze