Mistakes Learned from Operation Anaconda

ANACONDA's strategy is the last big fight between al Qaeda fighters and Afghan ordinary coalition forces. This is a typical example of the need to change American war strategy and doctrine to meet the demands of the current conflict. Operation ANACONDA is the name of the operation performed at Shah-i-Kowt Valley from 2 to 19 March 2002. Despite the challenge of intelligence, command and control issues, flaws in initial planning, negative actions on the ground and in the air, this behavior has proven to be a big victory for the United States and alliance.

In this article we will explore why the Anaconda's plan is inappropriate. The service company refused to discuss about the six-year action and brought worse service related wounds. This critical analysis of Anaconda wishes to begin a public debate, it will be the first step in restoring the explosive open spaces planning process. On 2 March 2002, after a two month plan, the Allies entered the Shahigot Valley in Afghanistan and was looking forward to the three day fight between the small Taliban and the Al Qaeda army. Instead, they found enemies that are five to ten times larger than they expected, and they saw a hidden place of heavy weapons in a possible approach and helicopter landing zone.

The United States discovered this rally, on March 2, 2002, the United States, Canada and the Afghan army began to perform 'Viper Action' against them. Truck force's hammer truck fought and there was no massive bombardment due to communication error. A well trained Afghan government army can not fight al Qaeda without air support. Using small firearms, rocket grenades and mujahide mortars were fixed to the cave and bunkers on the hillside, well beyond 3,000 meters (10,000 feet). They fired using "embarrassing escape" tactics and then retreated to their caves and bunkers to resist tempering and bombing. According to some estimates, US commanders initially estimated that their opponents were isolated pockets of 200 or fewer. Instead, the number of guerrillas is between 1,000 and 5,000. As of March 6, eight Americans, seven Afghan allies and up to 400 al Qaeda opposition militants were killed