Mackie's Arguments Against Objective Values

Mackie's Discussion on Objective Values ​​J. L. Mackie uses his brief statement to open his article "subjectivity of value" as "no objective value" and clarifies its position. McGee recently believes that it is necessary for him to strictly define the boundary of his position and concern as the dialogue in moral philosophy has been found to be full of misunderstanding and confusion of various moral positions I will. Hence, his article has two main parts: First, Mackie defines the nature of his moral skepticism and, secondly, he is a part of the moral realism through a series of arguments We will keep his position by showing low reliability.

Summary: As we all know, J. L. McKee is famous for having no objective values. I will investigate the explanation of what the objective value of Mackie actually is and then try to examine and understand his argument against these entities. Specifically, I would like to see if his argument applies to Kant's objective values. Therefore, this conversation is also Kant's explanation and Mackie's explanation (at least when I understand them). Mackie believes objective values ​​(if any) have strange causal relationships. Specifically, these entities have the ability to make objects recognize their motives (whatever it means, comply with their recommendations). Is this power strange in metaphysics?

"With objective values, they are very strange entities or relationships that are quite different from the rest of the universe" (38). What is strange about them? Maggie said that Plato's form (in this case, the unnatural features of Moore) will give us a "dramatic picture" that shows what objective value is. It is such a form of good, that knowledge is offered. Intellectuals have both direction and overwhelming motivation; some good things will pursue it and tell people who know this to make him pursue it. Everyone who is familiar with it is not due to the accidental fact that this person or everyone constitutes the result he wishes, but it is not objective just because the result has to be established in some way I will ask you. enter

J. L. Mackie keeps moral skepticism with three specific arguments. His first argument came from cultural relativism. Maggie saw the problem that what we call objective moral belief does not seem to shape our culture. Instead, our culture seems to form our particular moral beliefs like monogamy. Therefore, moral subjectivity is the most rational explanation for our moral beliefs to imitate our culture. His second argument for moral realism is that there is something strange or counterintuitive in the description of the objective moral field that someone may give. There are three differences in this discussion. First of all, there are metaphysical questions, or questions based on the strange state of mind advocated by realists. For McGee, the weirdness of this field is a debate over it. Second, since it is not clear how this field relates to natural objects and human behavior, there is a relationship problem.