Long Term Care Insurance

For example, although these "daily living activities" are the most necessary services for elderly people, medical insurance plans are not useful for paying personal care services such as meals, changing clothes, using bathrooms (Green, 2003) . These nursing care services can be offered to the elderly through the long-term care insurance system. According to a nationwide survey conducted by people over 55, only 36% think that long-term insurance is necessary (Carter, 2008). However, it is estimated that at least 60% of people over the age of 65 need long-term care at certain stages of life (Carter, 2008).

Long-term care insurance Long-term care insurance includes nursing care and support costs for families, communities, and residential facilities. Long-term long-term care insurance usually includes community-based services such as nursing homes, home-based services including nursing care and personal care support, nursing home, nursing care facilities, nursing care provided by Alzheimer's special medical facilities, etc. Alzheimer's Association Family affects Alzheimer's Disease Report 2016 2016 Alzheimer's Disease Facts and Data 28% of over 3,500 respondents believe that Medicare is paying for Alzheimer's disease 37% of nursing care expenses do not know whether or not to cover nursing care expenses of nursing care facilities 293 Medicare covers nursing care hospital, special medical institutions, specialized medical care and hospice care, but does not include long-term care at nursing home. .463

Kessler (2008) discussed the long-term care insurance market. Providing long-term care insurance to insurance companies has three major risks. Risk of cost increase, risk of counter selection, and moral hazard. Despite these risks, long-term care insurance is a potential expanded market for insurance companies that can innovate and design products based on this specific need. Saito (2006) studied whether there is a possibility that interest rate regulation will lead to a disadvantageous choice or moral hazard, which prevents insurers from considering certain driver attributes when setting premiums. Using personal data sets from tightly regulated automobile insurance markets, the authors did not find evidence of adverse choice or moral hazard: risks and coverage ranges are not statistically dependent. This finding supports the view that in this market there is only a limited range of adverse selections.