Kripke’s Modal Argument Against Type Identity Theories

Type recognition theory focuses on the same premise that the brain and brain are the same, discusses the mental state and reduces them to the physical state. Solkripk made several influential criticisms on type identification theory. Kripke 's criticism depends on the view of essentialism, form, and possible world semantics (Hankes) Kripke' s argument is an argument against identity theory, a mental condition indistinguishable from their respective physical state . Likewise, Kripke relies on the concept of exact indicators and such exact indicators must object to identity statements.

The zombie debate is a kind of general modal argument against physicalism, such as Solkripk's physicalism and physicalism, which is known as type identity theory. In the 1970s, Thomas Nagel (1970; 1974) and Robert Kirk (1974) further proposed such a discussion, but David Chalmers was in "conscious consciousness" (1996). This argument is most famous. According to Chalmers, one can think of a complete zombie world in a coherent way, the world is physically indistinguishable from the world, but lacks a completely conscious experience. All conscious opponents of our world are p zombies. As Chalmers can imagine such a world, we claim that metaphysics is possible, it is needed by all arguments. Chalmers says that: "Zombies may not be the possibilities of nature, because they can not exist in our world, it is that natural law."

It is necessary to mention here that Saul Kripke and David Chalmers have influential criticism of identity theory. Kripke's remarks are due to the morphologic, possible global semantics and essentialistic ideas that some philosophers wish to claim, and Chalmer's long article, so it is important to discuss in detail It is impossible. And rich book deserves a long answer. Kripke (1980) expresses its expression as a strict indicator if the expression points to the same object in every possible world. Or in the corresponding theory, it will have completely equivalent counterparts in every possible world. In my opinion, we believe that counterparts are very contextual. As an example, take "water is H2O". In another world imagined by Putnam, or in our world twins (1975), it is not water because the ones found in the river, lake, and ocean are XYZ instead of H2O.

But most philosophers now are convinced that Quel 's "mathematical bicycle" debate was completely answered by Solkrip (1972), Alvin Plantinger (1974) and other forms of defenders. The defenses of the form of Kripke and Plantinga are typical of metaphysics (unless they directly solve the Quinn language argument). Both use possible concepts of the world to preserve the understandability of modality (de re and de dicto). Leibniz was the first philosopher to use "a possible world" as an artistic philosophical term, but Kripke and Plantinger used this expression differently from him. For Leibniz, a possible world is a possible creation. God's creative behavior is that he chooses a possible world out of many people and becomes the world he created, the "real world". But for Kripke and Plantinga the potential world may be "all reality". For Leibniz, God and its actions "stand" outside all possible worlds.