Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox and the Ethics of Belief*

In this chapter, we will consider the question "When is it possible to terminate the survey?" The answer to this question may be that when a person knows p, it can terminate the query to p. After all, if S knows p, other evidence that p may have gotten to be misleading or duplicates. In this chapter, we believe there is a possibility that cognitive negligence by private investigation reduces human cognitive ability and leads to loss of knowledge. In addition, I believe that terminating the survey may lead to a loss of reasonable beliefs. Because the origins of individual beliefs are constantly extinguished.

As a by-product of solving the coincidence test paradox Solkripk proposed a "doctrinal paradox" that seems to indicate that knowledge requires doctrinal theory. In this paper, the author analyzes the nature of the doctrinal paradox from the viewpoint of logic mechanics. The authors believe that doctrinal paradoxes are better understood as knowledge attribution rather than knowledge paradoxes. Therefore, you can solve the doctrinal paradox without sacrificing the trapped principle of enlightenment. Based on the relevant alternative theory of the famous version, the authors analyzed the logic of knowledge attribution, ie how to reuse knowledge attribution by formalizing public undo logic and expanding related substitutions.

Solkrip's reflection on the surprising test paradox made him paradoxical about doctrine. In 1972, he talked about the two paradoxes of Ethics Science Club at Cambridge University. (Descendants of this lecture are currently available at Kripke 2011). Gilbert Harman passed Kripke 's new paradox as follows. If you know that \ (h \) is correct, you can see that the evidence for \ (h \) is evidence for a particular thing. Knowing this evidence is misleading. But I need to ignore the misleading evidence I know. Therefore, if you find that \ (h \) is correct, you can ignore future evidence that seems to apply to \ (h \). (1973, 148)

It is an abstraction. My goal is to solve the doctrinal paradox of Kripke. It is not unreasonable for A to ignore all the evidence for p for a particular proposition p known to p. In the process I propose that the definition of A is about the doctrine of p, and in statement A, distinguish between objective and subjective "should", all evidence for p should be ignored. In most cases, I will deal with the original version of Kripke's paradox. In this case, the subject would like to avoid losing her true faith or getting a false belief; in the last section I examined the possibility of a paradox. This paradox is for the subject with knowledge above anything else.