It is not, it is impossible. All so-called "positive" duties are impossible to achieve, morality never calls impossible.
Let us assume that we have an obligation to help others so that we do not hurt others. When I went to bed, I did not hurt anyone, but I did not help someone else. So, through this assumption, I am evil through sleepinng. Obviously this is ridiculous, so there is no obligation to help others.
We can avoid hurting innocent people at any time. This is very easy. We can sometimes help others, it is fine.
In the words of bioethics, these obligations are often explained as useful and provide obligation to improve health (or sometimes express interests to others) health and welfare care. Respect for obligation to harm, autonomy, people's general obligation to self-decide their own choices of life and body, and obligation to avoid discrimination based on justice and irrelevant characteristics (individuals in morally relevant circumstances Expressed as equality treatment) Under the label of justice, it is the responsibility to assign healthcare resources in a way that can be defended to be fair. Fairness rather than arbitrary or capricious
In any case, this correspondence to distributive objections depends on our ability to balance our special obligation with our natural or inevitable duty. According to the defenders of the vast majority of special obligations, such obligations are provisional obligations, that is, they are obligations with a certain weight and are offset by the weight of other special obligations or other types of obligations be able to. In order to understand what all of our responsibilities are, we need to weigh all our reasons for action and decide which is the strongest or the heaviest. One of the benefits of result theory and other theory treats all duties or responsibilities as derived from the basic obligation (duty to maximize value), so we decide which of the responsibilities is the strongest There is no need to do. Any instance
What is special about special obligations? One way to answer this question is to compare special obligations with specific non-special duties or obligations. Examples of such "non-special" obligations or obligations are supported by the results. (Special obligations can be contrasted with other non - special obligations, see section III). According to one form of resultantism, the correct behavior is the behavior that produces the net maximum intrinsic value in all alternatives available to the agent, the intrinsic value is not intended by itself, It is the value of itself. Different things (Of course there are many forms of consequentialism - the important feature of these ideas for our purposes is that they understand the right acts as the outcome of the act (actual, possible or possible) That is the result, and that is the result.