Intention Consists of Belief, Intention Does Not Entail Belief

The intention includes beliefs and we can not be confident in our intention. In this article we will explain the theory of intention of Gilbert Harman and J. David Velleman. The central controversy between the two theories of intention is that Harman believes that the intention requires faith, and Wellman believes the intention includes beliefs. Wellman has built an intention model that intent consists of beliefs to explain the apparent spontaneity of the agent's self-knowledge. On the other hand, Herman refused the assertion that he was intended to contain beliefs for examples including insomnia.

Intentional system theory contains two general concepts. First, the concept of intentional state such as our conceptual belief, desire, recognition, etc. is a theoretical concept whose identity and existence are determined by commonsense psychology or folk psychology. Folk psychology assumes that the subject is reasonable, assumes that there is a tendency to lead to explicit logical reasoning from what he believes and to take action to satisfy them, the subject perceives himself It is a set of general principles stipulating that there is a tendency to believe things. Believe desire. In many cases, we apply fork psychology to animals to predict and understand behavior of animals. When doing this we treat animals as a conscious system and accept their intentional stance as Dennett (1987) said. The second important idea of ​​intentional system theory is instrumental interpretation of folk psychology. Need more

Folk psychology explains human behavior based on psychological state including beliefs, desires, intentions. Psychological mechanisms, including intention, explain behavior. Because individuals are considered actors to achieve and achieve the goals led by faith. Consequently, intentional action is a function that achieves the desired goal, and the conviction that the behavior process satisfies that desire. There is also a theoretical difference between intentional (intentional behavior) and mental state of future intention. Searle (1983) has marked them as action intent and previous intention, respectively. The previous intention reflects the foresight of the intention of action; the previous intention need not be considered as intention. The unintended intention is the previous intention, there is no action related to it.