Intent as a dichotomic agent between folk psychology and identity theory

The framework of modern philosophical thinker's choice is physicsism, which integrates spiritual research into 'scientific' human knowledge regulated by material laws and energy laws. In this article we provide an argument that supports incompatibilities between two different psychological theories, namely brain brain perception theory (IT) and private psychology (FP) based on logical reasons. The first part of this article explains to the reader about the basic concepts, definitions, and key parameters used in IT and FP.

Intentional system theory contains two general concepts. First, the concept of intentional state such as our conceptual belief, desire, recognition, etc. is a theoretical concept whose identity and existence are determined by commonsense psychology or folk psychology. Folk psychology assumes that the subject is reasonable, assumes that there is a tendency to lead to explicit logical reasoning from what he believes and to take action to satisfy them, the subject perceives himself It is a set of general principles stipulating that there is a tendency to believe things. Believe desire. In many cases, we apply fork psychology to animals to predict and understand behavior of animals. When doing this we treat animals as a conscious system and accept their intentional stance as Dennett (1987) said. The second important idea of ​​intentional system theory is instrumental interpretation of folk psychology. Need more

Similar to the theory of intentional systems, commonsense functionalism considers the concept of our intentional state to be a theoretical concept belonging to our folk psychology. However, unlike conscious system theory, common sense functionalism provides a realistic interpretation of folk psychology. (In addition, many commonsense functionalists reject the rational hypothesis of intentional systematic theory on folk psychology (Fodor 1987, 1991).) In the realist interpretation, The subject is independent of the subject in his brain. Internal state, they play a causal role and have an internal structure described by our intentional national concept. And because the behavior of animals has been successfully predicted and explained by our folk psychology, some people think that it is the reason why an animal can actually assume that this internal state is in the brain (Fodor 1987; Stich 1979; Carruthers 2004)