Intelligence Failures: 9/11 and Pearl Harbor

Throughout history, there were various information errors such as 9/11 and Pearl Harbor. These failures are due to postponed information gathered or misunderstood by others in the intelligence community. Both cases resulted in disastrous results, but these tragic events made it possible to develop better security such as warning signals and preparations to protect the United States. Pearl Harbor is still considered one of the most serious intelligence failures in the history of the United States.

But accusing Belgium because of vulnerability to terrorism in Europe is far too simplistic. After all the serious security incidents from Pearl Harbor through September 11 and the Paris attack in November last year, we found ignored warnings and original information that were not evaluated in a timely and effective way It was. The National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were warned before the September 11 terrorist attack, but the terrorists slid down from their fingers. According to the report of the 9/11 committee, coordination in various jurisdictions in New York City and the United States makes coordination difficult. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher fled in his life despite advice when the Republican Army in Ireland bombed the Conference of Britain Conservatives Party in 1984.

The traditional way of thinking about Pearl Harbor and the September 11 double disaster is the responsibility of the decision maker ignoring or misunderstanding the signs of danger. However, Dar's argument is that despite massive strategic information, it has failed to collect data related to tactical problems. Without specific details of operational tactical information, the available information is too general and not worth the operational value. The policy maker's ability to not want to believe that their enemies are fighting the United States in meaningful ways exacerbates this problem.

Erikdal's book "Intelligence and Amazing Attacks" suggests that the lack of precise tactical intelligence suggests that the US fleet was attacked in Pearl Harbor, and policy makers are reluctant to believe in their attacking abilities from home in Japan . These two facts cover more than 1,400 US soldiers. Dahl also gave a similar view on the Sept. 11 attack. Despite the large amount of strategic information gathered over the years, there is no tactical warning. As with Pearl Harbor attacks, policy makers are reluctant to believe in the ability of enemies to attack the United States, especially in a unique way. These two facts bring about twice the death of the day of shame.