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Human Factors On Aloha 243

2023-11-15 23:02:37

After investigating the aircraft accident of Aloha in 1933, our team was interested in investigating the performance factors of maintenance and inspection personnel. I divided the survey into five areas. Survey: There is no negligence on the actual procedure and the mechanism in policy planning. Because Aloha Airlines is doing flight between islands in Hawaii, Aloha 243 operates in seawater environment. During each flight, if the aluminum sheet does not adhere to the fuselage via the epoxy adhesive, air saturated with salt and water vapor will enter the gap and the metal will corrode further.

It is no wonder that the inspector missed the stress crack of the airframe of Aloha Airlines Flight 243. A part of the roof peeled at 24 thousand feet, threw the crew into the sea and seriously injured the other ten people. The inspector also missed the fact that the aircraft is the second oldest aircraft currently in service. Another reason FAA hinders the safe development of airlines is the airline industry regulation. FAA needs to standardize the radiation routing system. In this system, multiple takeoffs and landings were made on a single trip. Multiple takeoff and landings occurring in a spoke type spoke system cause a significant increase in accident risk because approximately 80% of the accident occurs during takeoff or landing. (Phillip and Talley, 251) Concentrated radiation routing system also includes smaller commuters

MRM was developed as a result of a series of events that promoted development. As CRM evolved from reactions to tragic events, another important incident led to human factor training based on MRM development and maintenance. In 1988, Aloha Air Service 243 was hit by a devastating accident. The aircraft was torn at an altitude of 24000 feet, and the 18 ft body was forced to make an emergency landing (NTSB 1989). After the accident, the US Federal Aviation Administration issued Airworthiness Directive (AD), which requires B-737's near-distance visual inspection of 1,300 rivets. (AD 93-13-02)