Freedom and Reason In Kant

Kant said that freedom and reason in Kant's moral can not be regarded as a set of rules that define the necessary means to achieve a specific purpose and must be followed without consideration of the result . The premise that the target object is used as a determinant of will can not produce a moral law; that is, when the will is materially determined its moral problem is not so. Appears.

In order to broadly understand Kant's theory of freedom, I will list some arguments about Kant's reason and freedom of criticism for pure reasons, the foundation of moral metaphysics, and criticism for practical reasons. But before I do, I would like to mention some aspects of his view, but I will not discuss in these contexts. One is Kant (Will and Wilkure) (after at least the second critique), the difference in the functions of the two aspects or the will system (MM 6: 213-14, 226). Will is a legislative aspect and through will, a reasonable existence will give our own law; Kant recognizes will for purely practical reasons. It itself is neither free nor free. Willkür is the execution side or function of a will, it is considered a free side

In addition to deriving his best moral principles, the most difficult questions about Kant's rationality practice focus on his freedom relationship. A rough overview is consistent, but the view on Kant's subject matter seems to be more than usual in his critical research. (See Kant's moral philosophy by Ellison in 1990, chapter 10, short sketches, and skilled, but undisputable statements.) Interaction with unconditional practice rules "mutually implicit" ( 5: 29 f) Meanwhile, freedom means that practical reasons may be pure (non-organized, unconditional). From the perspective of our moral support, we must be free.

Freedom plays a central role in Kant's ethics, as the possibility of moral judgment presupposes it. Freedom is a rational concept with essential practical functions. Without the assumption of freedom, reason can not act. If we believe that we are totally determined by causality and that we are not the reason not to lead ourselves, then any rule attempting to assume a means of achieving a specific purpose is meaningless. I do not think I will completely obey the law of causality and I can act according to the concept of the principle that leads my wish. We can not help, if we want to take action, achieve our goal and understand the world, we can not help but I think that our actions are the result of the unresolved cause.