Exploring Obligations in a Legal Sense

There are many meanings in investigating negligence of voluntary infringement in a legal sense. It may be an act of infringement by negligence, or it may be a negligence act. Those who completely ignore the safety of others and do not harm others can be morally condemned, but they do not sin by negligence. On the other hand, those who do their best but who have fallen below the criteria set by the court and who caused some damage are responsible. [1] Negligence is judged by a series of objective criteria, and the court reviews what what "responsible men and women" do in defendant's position.

However, as a matter of course I will take the following explanation. There are legal communities where members are legal entities with (legal) claims and legal entities with (legal) obligations. In such a system, if someone dismisses the legal obligation of the recipient, the corporation has the right to invoke legal instances to enforce that right. The main problem is whether there is a legal right for the fetus (or embryo, concept, fertilized egg) to survive, ie whether there is a conflict between the fetus and the self-determination power of pregnant women (autonomy principle) . Is the fetus a corporation?

Why not treat political obligations and Parek's "civic obligation" but obligations to comply with the law as legal obligations? The answer is that different legal obligations have different jobs. For many legal philosophers, the statement that a person has a legal obligation to execute X is only a descriptive assertion, a statement of social facts. The fact that a person has a legal obligation to execute X can only be justified if he has a moral obligation, that is, a political obligation to comply with the law. The value of this distinction is to allow people to think that even if she does not comply with the political obligations of authoritative authorities, people can be subject to legal obligations. Assuming that the administration is tyranny, incompetence, or very unjustifiable, only Hobbes will assume the moral obligation to follow by the person under his command