Exorbitant Privilege, by Barry Eichengreen

I. INTRODUCTION The need to manage the world's dollar dependence today is a matter recognized and often dealt with by global academic and political platforms 1. Since the 2008 World Crisis, the most since the 1930s Serious Issues The financial crisis is not only a top economist but also a major discussion in major countries around the world and is looking for alternatives to the dollar. Following the recent closure of the administration, China also sought a new world order called "outside the US" [2].

Today these important events in the 1930 's seem different from the scholars of that era (see Barry Eichengreen Golden Fetters' work, see How to Prevent Currency War from 1919 - 1939, especially Currency Depreciation). There is more nuance. Ben Bernanke's view on this issue is as follows. ... The close cause of the recession in the world is an international gold standard with structural defects and insufficient management. ... The FRB's desire to curb the boom in the US stock market, for a variety of reasons, in the latter half of the 1920s monetary policy of some major countries began to shrink. This is a global contraction due to the gold standard. When the banking and currency crisis of 1931 caused international competition for gold, the first moderate deflation process began to snowball

Recent research by economists such as Temin, Ben Bernanke and Barry Eichengreen focused on the constraints confronted by policy makers during the Great Depression. In this view, the limitation of the gold standard between wars is a major obstacle to all actions that can expand the initial economic shock and improve the expanding depression. According to them, the first unstable shock may have been caused by the collapse of Wall Street in the United States in 1929, but it is the gold standard that hands the problem to the rest of the world.

Barry Eichengreen was surprised at the unexpected flexibility of the macroeconomic management system in Europe. Prior to the crisis, stabilization and growth agreements and rigidification of the European currency alliance had been concerned that it would prevent the EU from responding promptly to the financial crisis (Eichengreen, 2007a). In fact, despite the initial delay in rate cuts, the ECB responded very quickly by providing essentially unlimited liquidity to the euro area financial system. At the same time, the stability and growth agreement has been relaxed, and the ability of the government to borrow and rebuild capital for banks has increased. These EU measures may help offset the relative weakness of domestic economic stimulus measures.