Determinism and Free will

Determinism and freedom assume that each event or action has sufficient cause to cause that event. Today, in our scientific era, this seems like a reasonable assumption. After all, you can imagine those who claim seriously no reason for rain, plane crash accident or business success. Of course, human behavior is triggered. It will not happen without a reason. The type of human behavior that people are morally responsible is often considered to be caused by people involved in the act.

According to philosopher J. J. C. Smart, the standard discussion on free will focuses on the influence of determinism on "free will". But he believes that freedom will be denied, regardless of whether determinism is true or not. On the other hand, if the certainty is true, all our actions are predicted, we can not be considered free, but if the determinism is false our actions are random It is considered to be. It is not involved in controlling what happens. Author and neuroscientist Sam Harris also opposed free will in his "moral landscape". He offered crazy scientists representing thinking experiments, determinism. In Harris' example, a crazy scientist uses a machine to control all the desires of a particular human, thereby controlling all actions. In this case, Harris thinks that it is no longer attractive to say that the victim has "free will".

Compatibility provides a solution to the free will problem. It involves a controversial mismatch between free will and determinism. Compatibility is an argument that free will is compatible with determinism. Compatibility may be expressed as a discussion of compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism, as free will is often regarded as a necessary condition for moral responsibility. The strict definition of a free will criticism is misleading. Because there is no single concept in the philosophical work of this concept. In most cases, philosophers working on this issue have pursued the characteristics of agents necessary for people to have moral responsibility for their behavior. Different attempts to clarify conditions of moral responsibility will produce different institutional descriptions needed to meet these conditions.

Many of the philosophical benefits of free will / determinism problems are based on concerns about moral responsibility because it is generally accepted that having free will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Therefore, if determinism excludes free will, it also eliminates moral responsibility. However, to distinguish free will from the moral responsibility problem (whether it exists, what it is, compatibility with determinism, compatibility with others) is very It is important. Some people think that there is free will and freedom is compatible with determinism, and I think that there is no other person who is morally responsible for other reasons. Some people think that there is no free will for determinism or other reasons, others oppose the traditional wisdom, others believe that we are morally responsible.