Davidson's "The Folly of Trying to Define Truth"

Davidson's "trying to define the foolishness of truth" A discussion on the possibility of defining the truth of Davidson uses the work of Tarski. However, Tarski believes that the semantics of semantic truth only applies to formal languages ​​without semantic closure. The premise is to impair the theory of realistic expression, where our recognition may be a representation of reality or error.

But, according to Davidson, it should be noted that the truth is primitive and always corresponds to the existing world, so the truth is not clearly defined by consistency and belief. More importantly, although Davidson asserts the theory of his consistency, assuming that the agent's belief is reality, he argues that the possibility of a further erroneous belief that the agent may have Accept. The truth, the real thing '27 Hillary · Putnam poses a complicated form of suspicion in "rationality, truth and history" (1981), "brain in the brain". This possibility encourages me to assume what to do if my current experience (or sensation) meets scientists' hope, if we are really a big brain barrel It was. The claim of "the brain in the brain" says:

Donald Davidson combines behavior theory with truth and semantic theory. For him, the explanation of truth is also an explanation of the agent, and vice versa. By referring to "rationality", "normality", "intentionality", and "agent" as if they are common predicates, Davidson is aware of all forms of appearing in the context in which the description was approved I was able to claim that it was a description. Intentional action reseller - You can explain only when using standard vocabulary, not just to make a sound. Normative behavior of the communicator involved makes the intentional position different from the biological position

As part of a larger research project initiated by Tarski and Davidson, many logicologists, linguists, philosophers, and cognitive scientists often cooperate to pursue a research program that attempts to clarify the conditions of truth . . The propositions expressed by these complicated sentences are as follows. Many philosophers divide propositional categories into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive subclasses. Proposition proposition Discontinuity (ie, necessarily truth or inevitably fake one)