Case study: Introduction to Pinto Fires is the root of evil, or motivation for at least some companies to make good ethical decisions. The Ford Motor Company is caught in a greedy trap that kills a lot of people. Prior to the disaster of Pinto Fires, Ford Motor Company was known as a safety pioneer in the automotive industry, including seat belts. However, with the advent of invention of compact cars, Ford began to relax market share in overseas markets.
Pinto's reputation for safety has been controversial since the 1970s. That fuel tank design attracted media and government censorship, and some deadly fire ruptured the tank with a rear crash. Subsequent analysis of Pint's overall safety showed that it is comparable to other compact cars in the 1970s. Security issues surrounding focus and subsequent Ford's correspondence were cited widely as case studies of corporate ethics and infringement reform reform
An academic research announced in decades after the release of Pinto studied this case and provided a general understanding of Pinto's general understanding and controversy on the safety performance of the car and the fire risk. This study also reviews the actual fire-related deaths related to fuel system design, "other claims to assertions not supported by insanity", facts concerning related litigation, misconceptions of Grimshaw and Ford Motor Company and Indiana At Ford Motor Company, safety standards applied at design time, as well as NHTSA survey and subsequent vehicle recall nature
The ethical approach to the Ford Pinto case made it difficult to accept the risk / benefit analysis made by Ford Motor Company. When adopting the right decision based on numbers, Ford adopted the policy of essentially allowing a certain number of people to die or injured, even if they blocked it. Depending on the situation, this decision seems to be obviously ignored for human life. From a human rights standpoint, Ford ignored the rights of the injured people, so he decided not to adjust the fuel system, he took unethical behavior.