BonJour's 'Basic Antifoundationalist Argument'

BonJour's "basic anti-fundamental argument" Abstract: BonJour believes there is no basic empirical belief. But Assumptions 3 and 4 together gave rise to the "Bon Jour rule" - considering human psychology, p is reasonable only when there is reason to believe that the premise of the argument is likely to be very likely I believe. Responding to his skepticism, limiting premise 3 to basic beliefs and failing to note that the rules do not need "clear" beliefs will fail.

The details of Shirasu 's actual discussion are difficult to decipher. The most promising reorganization of the Silas argument occurred in chapter 4 of BonJour (1985). BonJour uses the concept of "representative content with confidence" to cause a dilemma. Metaphorical content is the content of faith, hope, fear. Faith, hope, fear may be the same; people can believe in rain, hope for rain, or worry about rain. All of these states have the same representative content. Representative content of confidence is expressed as actual content, but in reality it may be wrong. A good example of confident content is coming from the Müller-Lyer illusion. In this known experiment, the subject passes through two vertical lines, ie they have the same length, but their lengths are not equal. The subject's experience indicates that the content is not equal.

In light of the concept of representative content that has confidence, BonJour reexplains Silas's predicament: Experience representative content that is confident both. If your experience contains representative content that you trust, you need another reason to believe that the content is correct. However, if experiences lack such content, we can not provide any reason for believing that an experienced proposition is correct. This dilemma mainly focuses on non-executive fundamentalism and believing that regardless of how we fulfill this view, we can not prove that experience is the correct basis for justification It is customary.

Weak fundamentalism is an interesting form of fundamentalism. Lawrence BonJour presents this view as a possible fundamentalist view in his book (1985), "The Structure of Empirical Knowledge". According to BonJour's view, weak fundamentalists believe that some non-speculative beliefs are minimalistically rational and that such reasons are not sufficient to satisfy the justification of knowledge. In addition, this reason is not sufficient to make personal beliefs a necessary condition to keep other beliefs (see BonJour (1985), 30). But since knowledge and reasoning are fundamental features of our cognitive practice, the natural conclusion of weak fundamentalism is that consistency among our beliefs requires sufficient reason for knowledge, and one belief That is the premise of other beliefs. . Therefore, for weak fundamentalists, consistency plays an irreplaceable role in knowledge and reasoning.